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Abstract: We show that an agent maximizing some utility function
on a discrete (as opposed to continuous) consumption space will obey
the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) so long as the
agent obeys cost eciency. Cost eciency will hold if there is some
good, outside the set of goods being studied by the modeler, that can
be consumed by the agent in continuous quantities. An application
of Afriat's Theorem then guarantees that there is a strictly increasing
utility function on the discrete consumption space that rationalizes
price and demand observations in that space.
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11. Introduction
The revealed preference theory of Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Var-
ian (1982) was developed in the context of a continuous consumption space,
typically assumed to be the positive orthant of a Euclidean space. How-
ever, the consumption possibilities available to a consumer are often discrete,
which gives rise to an \untidy veil" between theory and data.
A basic question that one could ask when given a set of consumer data
(of the prices and demand over a set of goods) is whether they are consistent
with utility maximization, i.e., whether there is a utility function such that
each observation solves the utility maximization problem of the consumer,
conditional on the level of expenditure. When the consumption space is con-
tinuous, it is well-known that a set of observations is consistent with utility
maximization if and only if it obeys the generalized axiom of revealed prefer-
ence (GARP). However, when the consumption space is discrete, GARP is no
longer necessary for consistency with utility maximization, so the continued
use of this property in such a context requires a dierent justication.
In this paper, we show that GARP remains a necessary restriction on the
data set, even when the consumption space is discrete, so long as, in addition
to utility-maximization, the consumer also takes cost eciency into account
by choosing the cheapest bundle amongst the bundles that give the same
utility. We show that in many empirical settings, cost eciency is a natu-
ral assumption to make. This is because an economist studying consumer
demand is not typically trying to model the consumer's behavior across the
entire range of possible consumption goods. Instead he or she would have
data only over some subset K of goods and would be trying to infer the con-
sumer's preference over goods in K from demand behavior over those (same)
goods. It is well-known that this approach is valid only when the agent's
2preference on the consumption space of K is independent of the consump-
tion of goods outside that set; in other words, if the agent's overall utility
function, dened on all goods, has a separability property. Taking this larger
context into account, we show that cost eciency in the demand for goods in
K is necessary for overall utility maximization, so long as the agent's utility
is increasing in some continuous good outside the set K. Therefore, a set of
observations of prices and demand for goods in K from such a consumer will
obey GARP, and one could then construct a utility function rationalizing
those observations using Afriat's Theorem.
2. Violations of GARP in a discrete consumption space
Consider a consumer who chooses from a consumption space X; we as-
sume that X is contained in, but not necessarily equal to RK
+; for example,
we could have X = ZK
+, the set of integral consumption points. For x 2 X,
the kth entry of x species the consumer's consumption of the kth good. A
modeler makes observations of a consumer; at observation t, the consumer
chooses the bundle xt 2 X, when the prices of the K goods are given by the
vector pt 2 RK
++. Let O be a set of observations, consisting of (pt;xt), for
t = 1;:::;T. A utility function u : X ! R is said to rationalize the set of
observations O if xt solves
max
x2X
u(x) subject to pt  x  pt  xt: (1)
The set O is said to obey the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP)
if whenever there are observations (pk;xk) (k = 1;2;:::;n) in O satisfying
p1x2  p1x1; p2x3  p2x2; :::; pn 1xn  pn 1xn 1; pnx1  pnxn (2)
then all the inequalities have to be equalities. It is well-known and straight-
forward to check that if the set of observations are drawn from an agent
3maximizing a locally non-satiated utility function U : X = RK
+ ! R, then
the observations will obey GARP. Afriat's Theorem tells us the converse: if
the observations obey GARP, then there is a strictly increasing1 and concave
utility function U : X = RK
+ ! R that rationalizes that data.2 The following
two examples consider what happens when the consumption space is discrete
rather than RK
+. In both examples, we assume that money is used for the
purchase of two goods which can only be bought in whole units, so X = Z2
+.
Example 1. Suppose that in period 1, we observe p1 = (3;3) and x1 =
(1;2), followed by p2 = (6;2) and x2 = (2;0) in period 2. This is depicted in
Figure 1a. Plainly we have a violation of GARP since p1x1 > p1x2 and p2
x2 > p2x1. And it is also the case that these observations are not compatible
with the maximization of a strictly increasing utility function. Suppose to the
contrary that the agent is maximizing such a utility function. Then Period
2's observation reveals that (2;0) is weakly preferred to (1;3) and (because
the utility function is strictly increasing) (1;3) is strictly preferred to (1;2),
so (2;0) is strictly preferred to (1;2). On the other hand, in period 1, (1;2) is
chosen even though (2;0) is available, so we obtain a contradiction. Indeed, it
is straightforward to see that we could make a stronger claim: with these two
budget sets, every violation of GARP is incompatible with the maximization
of a strictly increasing utility function.
Example 2. In Figure 1b, we rst observe p1 = (4;3) and x1 = (1;2) in
period 1, followed by p2 = (5;2) and x2 = (2;0) in period 2. Once again it
is clear that GARP is violated. However, it is plain that these choices are
compatible with rationality in the sense that there is a strictly increasing
1 Formally, if x0 > x then U(x0) > U(x).
2 For a short proof of this result see Fostel et al. (2004). A generalization of Afriat's
Theorem to nonlinear budget sets can be found in Forges and Minelli (2009).
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Figure 1: Revealed preference in a discrete consumption space
utility function dened on Z2
+ that could explain the data as solutions to
(1). The crucial dierence here is that (unlike the case above) we are not in
position to say that x2 is strictly preferred to x1 because there is no aordable
bundle (in the consumption space) in period 2, y, such that y > x1. So these
observations could be explained by some strictly increasing utility function
that gives the same utility to x1 and x2.
In an experimental setting, it may be possible for the experimenter to
ensure that budget sets are like those in Example 1. In that case, a viola-
tion of GARP can be legitimately considered a violation of rationality (for
example, see Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001)). However, in observa-
tional settings, budget sets are not prescribed by the observer and situations
like that depicted in Example 2 could arise; here GARP is violated and yet
the data are consistent with the maximization of a strictly increasing utility
function.
Does this mean that we should drop or modify GARP when studying
consumer choice over a discrete consumption space? The fundamental point
5we make in this Note is that that is not the case: while the observations
depicted in Example 2 are consistent with a consumer solving (1), they are
incompatible with a broader notion of rationality. This is because the con-
sumer is spending more money than necessary to achieve the same level of
utility: any utility function consistent with the observations in Example 2
must give the same utility to x1 and x2, and yet at each period, the consumer
chooses to buy the bundle that is more costly. In the next section, we for-
malize this intuition and give the conditions under which price and demand
observations from a discrete consumption space will still obey GARP.
3. GARP in observational data
We consider a consumer with the consumption space X Y , where X 
RK
+ and Y = R+, and the utility function u : X  Y ! R: We assume
that u has a weakly separable structure, i.e., there are functions v : X ! R
and ~ u : R  R+ ! R such that u(x;y) = ~ u(v(x);y); and where ~ u is strictly
increasing in both arguments. This last assumption means overall utility
increases strictly with the sub-utility derived from consumption in X, v(x),
and also consumption y of the (K+1)th good. We shall refer to this last good
as the continuous good since it could be consumed in innitesimal quantities.
The agent's problem is to
max
(x;y)2XY
u(x;y) = ~ u(v(x);y) subject to p  x + qy  m; (3)
where q > 0 is the price of the continuous good and p  0 the price vector
of bundles in X.3
3 We assume, for simplicity, that there is just one continuous good. It is not hard to
see that Proposition 1 goes through even when there are multiple goods apart from the
K goods in X. What is crucial is that one of those goods can be consumed in continuous
quantities and that the overall utility function ~ u is strictly increasing in that good.
6The main result of this Note is Proposition 1 below. It says that so
long as the agent is maximizing some overall utility function that includes a
continuous good, then observations of prices and demand for the K goods in
X will obey GARP, even when X is a discrete consumption space.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the set of observations O = f(pt;xt)g1tT; (of
the price and demand for the K goods in X) are drawn from a consumer
solving (3), with mt = pt  xt.4 Then O obeys GARP.
Proof: First we show that at any observation (pt;xt), the following proper-
ties hold: (i) if pt xt = pt x then v(xt)  v(x) and (ii) if pt xt > pt x then
v(xt) > v(x). Property (i) says that xt is utility-maximizing in the sense that
it must have weakly higher (sub)utility than any bundle that costs the same
while (ii) says that it is cost ecient, in the sense that if it costs more than
some other bundle, then it must give higher (sub)utility. Assuming (i) and
(ii), if (2) holds, then
v(x1)  v(xn)  v(xn 1)  :::  v(x2)  v(x1);
so they must all be equal. GARP requires that we cannot have ptxt0 < ptxt
in (2); this is true because it would imply (by (ii)) that v(xt0) < v(xt).5
To prove (i), suppose pt  xt = pt  x but v(xt) < v(x). Then the bundle
(x;yt) is strictly preferred by the agent to (xt;yt) (where yt is the (unob-
served) choice of the continuous good made by the agent) since ~ u is strictly
4 The observations do not include the price and the demand for the continuous good.
5 Just as (i) alone is not sucient to guarantee GARP (Example 2), so (ii) alone
is also not sucient. For example, suppose X = Z2
+, with U(0;2) = U(1;0) = 3 and
U(0;1) = 2; clearly this utility function is strictly increasing. Suppose that at the price
(1;1=2), we observe the consumer choosing (1;0) and at price (1;1), the consumer chooses
(0;1). These two observations are compatible with a consumer minimizing cost, subject
to utility targets of 3 and 2 respectively, but they violate GARP.
7increasing in the rst argument; furthermore, the bundle (x;yt) is also af-
fordable at observation t, so we obtain a contradiction.
To prove (ii), suppose pt  xt > pt  x but v(xt)  v(x). Then the bundle
(x;yt+[pt(xt x)]=qt) (where qt is the price of the continuous good at period
t) is strictly preferred by the agent to (xt;yt) since ~ u is strictly increasing in
the second argument and it is also aordable at period t. In other words,
because xt costs more than the bundle x without giving greater utility, the
agent is better o buying x and using the money saved to buy more of the
continuous good. So once again we obtain a contradiction. QED
Note that Proposition 1 does not require v to be an increasing or con-
cave function; the crucial assumption is that ~ u is strictly increasing in both
arguments. Of course, given that O obeys GARP, then a straightforward
application of Afriat's Theorem will guarantee the existence of a strictly
increasing and concave utility function that rationalizes O. This is stated
formally in the next result, which is the converse of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose the set of observations O = f(pt;xt)g1tT; (of the
price and demand for the K goods in X) obeys GARP. Then there exists a
function V : X ! R with the following properties:
(a) V rationalizes the data, i.e.,
xt 2 argmaxx2XV (x) subject to pt  x  pt  xt;
(b) for all x 2 X with pt  x < pt  xt, we have V (x) < V (xt);
(c) V admits an extension to RK
+ that is strictly increasing and concave (and
hence is strictly increasing and concave in X);6
(d) given any w > pt  xt for all t, there is a real number qt > 0 for every t




i=1 iV (xi) whenever xi (for
i = 1;2;:::;m) and
Pm
i=1 ixi are in X, where i > 0 (for i = 1;2;:::;m) and
Pm




(w   pt  xt)
qt

2 argmax(x;y)2XR+V (x) + y subject to pt  x + qty  w:
(4)
This proposition says (through properties (a) and (c)) that when O obeys
GARP, there is a strictly increasing and concave utility function dened on
the consumption space X that rationalizes the data; furthermore, with this
utility function, any bundle in X that is strictly cheaper than the observed
bundle will have strictly lower utility (property (b)). Property (d) says that
the observations in O are consistent with a consumer maximizing an overall
utility function dened on XR+; in other words, besides the K goods in X,
the consumer also demands a continuous good (though the price and demand
for this good are not observed). The utility function can be chosen to be
additively separable over these two good categories, i.e., U(x;y) = V (x)+y.
At each observation t, there is a price qt > 0 for the continuous good at which
the bundle (xt;[w   pt  xt]=qt) maximizes utility within the budget.8
Proof of Proposition 2: Since GARP holds, Afriat's Theorem tells us that
there is a strictly increasing and concave function  V : RK
+ ! R such that xt
maximizes  V (x) in the set fx 2 RK
+ : pt  x  pt  xtg. Since  V is strictly
increasing, we must have  V (x) <  V (xt) for any x with ptx < ptxt. Dening
V as the restriction of  V to X, it is clear that xt maximizes V (x) in the set
fx 2 X : pt  x  pt  xtg. So we have shown (a) to (c).
In fact, it is known that V can be chosen to have the following form:
V (x) = min
1tT
ft + tpt  (x   xt)g (5)
7 Note that the price of the continuous good qt is allowed to vary with t. If it does not,
then there exists V such that (4) holds for all t if and only if O obeys a property stronger
than GARP called cyclical monotonicity (see Brown and Calsamiglia (2007)).
8 Notice that there is some redundancy in the properties since we could in fact derive
(a) and (b) from (c) and (d), but we think this is a clearer way of stating the result.
9where t > 0 and the scalars t and t are chosen in such a way that V (xt) =
t (see Fostel et al. (2004)). If we set qt = 1=t, we obtain
V (x) +
(w   pt  x)
qt
 t + tpt  (x   xt) +
(w   pt  x)
qt
 t +
(w   pt  xt)
qt
= V (xt) +
(w   pt  xt)
qt
:
In other words, (d) holds. QED
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